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Every day, millions of people open their computers, unlock their phones and 
launch dating apps with the hope of finding a perfect match. The thought that one swipe 
could lead to a lifetime of love entices millions of Americans, more each day, into 
regularly using dating applications (Finkel, et al. 2). With the number of users rapidly 
growing, how are these online platforms changing the way people behave in the dating 
market? In order to better understand the way people value dating opportunities, I 
examine the “endowment effect” in the dating market. Generally applied to traditional 
market goods, the endowment effect describes the human tendency to value goods more 
highly just because they own them.  It is generally thought to be a manifestation of “loss 
aversion,” the human tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains 
(e.g., it is better to not lose $10 than to find $10.) 
In any market, the endowment effect reduces transactions, creates inefficiency 
and prevents the optimal allocation of resources. For example, Genesove and Mayer 
(2001) studied the housing market by exploring the correlation between the original 
purchase price of condos and subsequent listing prices when they are resold. Economic 
theory suggests that original purchase prices should be viewed as a sunk cost, not plaing a 
role in determining future listing prices. Instead, Genesove and Mayer found that there is 
a strong positive correlation between original purchase price and listing price, driving a 
wedge between the high prices sellers are willing to accept and the low prices buyers are 
willing to pay in these markets. This leads to “sticky prices,” which prevent the market 
from clearing and surplus from being realized.  
In the dating market, the endowment effect has the potential to reduce the 
efficiency of the matching process if people fail to break up with sub-optimal significant 
others because the looming feeling of loss overwhelms the potential gains from continued 
search. As far as I can determine, theoretical models on matching markets have not 
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considered the implications of loss aversion and the endowment effect for efficient 
matching. However, given strong evidence that these preference asymmetries exist for 
many different goods it is reasonable to expect that they might be present in dating 
markets. In fact, recent work by Nataf and Wallsten (2013) provide experimental 
evidence that the endowment effect exists in the dating market.  The objective of this 
thesis is to build on their work in several different ways.             
First, I examine whether the endowment effect exists for dating opportunities by 
running an online experiment where subjects who are randomly assigned to two different 
treatments where they are asked for (a) their willingness to accept for parting with a 
dating opportunity they have been endowed with, or (b) their willingness to pay for the 
date opportunity if they are in the non-endowment treatment. Next, I examine a key 
feature of online dating: access to an abundance of available and easily comparable 
dating opportunities. I hypothesize that when the number of dating alternatives increases, 
people will value each individual dating opportunity less. I expect the alternatives to help 
people overcome loss aversion, resulting in a weaker endowment effect in the online 
dating market. Due to previous research, I also expect women to be more loss averse than 
men in the dating market. In addition, I expect people who are interested in more casual 
or short-term relationships to display less loss aversion compared to people interested in 
more serious or long-term relationships, and for people with less dating experience to 
display more loss aversion than those with more experience.  
If online dating changes how people value individual dating opportunities, it may 
lead to positive behavioral changes in dating. If online dating reduces the endowment 
effect, it may enable people to move in and out of relationships more freely, with less 
friction. People may date more temporarily and have relationships with more people 
before marriage. Online dating reduces search costs, making it easier to learn a little bit 
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about a greater number of people. This information may help people find significant 
others with whom they are more compatible, creating better matches. In addition, if 
online dating platforms limit friction in the dating market, they may empower more 
people to leave sub-optimal or even abusive relationships. On the other hand, when the 
endowment effect diminishes, people may be less willing to sacrifice time and effort to 
build and retain relationships. The reduced time and effort put into relationships may 
restrict the enjoyment derived from them, stunting the quality of emotional connections.  
In addition, the increasing frequency of breakups may create negative externalities in 
social groups in the form of greater strain on friendships and family relationships. For 
example, weaker endowment effects could lead to more divorce, negatively affecting the 
environment in which children are raised.  
This study finds that simultaneous access to many dating options does indeed reduce 
the endowment effect in the dating market. This paper begins with a review of the 
literature on online dating, loss aversion, and the endowment effect, focusing first on key 
differences between online dating and traditional dating, followed by the potential 
psychological causes of the endowment effect. I then synthesize the economic and 
psychological theories that generate my hypothesis and outline the experimental method 
used to test it. After discussing the results of the experiment and the potential sources and 
directions of bias, I close with an analysis of the possible implications of the findings.  
 
I. Background 
 
A. Online Dating vs. Traditional Dating 
The emergence of online dating has fundamentally changed the traditional dating 
market. This change is largely the result of three features of the online dating market that 
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do not occur naturally in the traditional dating environment: (1) access to many potential 
romantic partners; (2) the ability to communicate with potential partners before meeting 
face-to-face; and (3) algorithmic matching of users with potential partners (Finkel, et al. 
1). These features contribute to large, well-functioning marketplaces, or online dating 
sites (e.g. Match.com, OkCupid, Tinder, etc..), where users have access to many other 
singles with whom they have things in common.  
This paper focuses specifically on the first of these three features: access to many 
dating opportunities. This results from the large number of users who join a particular 
online dating platform, a key element of any online platform’s value proposition. It is 
argued that access to a large number of opportunities has the potential to influence loss 
aversion in the dating market. Loss aversion is defined as the widespread human 
tendency to weigh losses more heavily than equivalent gains. In the context of the dating 
market, this implies that breakups or the loss of existing dating opportunities is more 
painful (generates greater dis-utilty) than the opportunity for a new relationship is 
exciting (increases utility). To effectively examine the impact of access on loss aversion 
in the dating market, it is important to consider the psychological implications of having 
a multitude of simultaneous, comparable dating alternatives at one’s fingertips. These 
psychological implications are the basis for the theoretical framework of this paper.  
 
B. The Psychology of Access 
People evaluate different key traits and prioritize different attributes using 
distinct cognitive decision processes (Finkel, et al. 32). One of these processes, separate 
evaluation, occurs when isolated options are presented and evaluated independently, 
while joint evaluation, occurs when more than one option is presented and users evaluate 
by comparison (Bazerman, et al. 576). Differences in cognitive decision processes can 
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drive both differences in preferences and differences in how highly people value dating 
opportunities. Simultaneous access to many potential dating opportunities, for example, 
transforms each user’s decision process from separate evaluation mode to joint evaluation 
mode (Finkel, et al. 32). The traits that people prioritize in joint evaluation mode may not 
be the same traits that create utility when a person experiences a choice outside the 
context of alternatives (Bazerman, et al. 588). For example, when potential matches are 
presented simultaneously, one might compare heights, eliminating shorter people from 
the realm of possibility (Ansari 96). This serves as a natural heuristic for narrowing the 
pool of options, since comparing height across people is easy. When one option is 
presented in isolation, however, people give less weight to observable physical 
characteristics. When considering one option who might be shorter than desired, for 
example, the evaluator may also discover that the option before them is also friendly and 
a good listener. Rather than focusing on height alone, a person might focus more on how 
contact with a potential match makes them feel. The latter attributes are arguably better 
predictors for longer term happiness in a relationship. Given multiple options, a person 
might narrow their choices using the height criteria alone, eliminating the possibility of 
discovering other characteristics that create utility (e.g. friendliness, listening skills, etc.) 
Therefore, having more options can, in theory, result in lower experienced utility1 when a 
face-to-face relationship actually begins (Finkel et al. 32).  
It is also possible that considering many profiles is more cognitively difficult and 
can decrease one’s level of interest in any one given profile (Finkel et al. 32). As users 
browse through many options, for example, engaging in joint evaluation with a 
comparison-oriented mindset, they may tend to objectify potential partners, seeing them 
more as commodities, or options in a marketplace, than as unique individuals (Heino, et 
                                                
1 Kahneman (1999) distinguishes between decision utility, which is based on wants and desires at 
the time of a decision, and experienced utility, which is defined as genuine enjoyment. 
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al. 444).  This objectification diminishes a user’s willingness to commit to a single option 
(Finkel, et al. 29). Carmon, et, al. (2003) suggest that a reduced willingness to commit to 
one option results from the unwillingness to lose alternative options due to developing 
small attachments to each option through the process of considering them. People are 
aware that choosing a single person and giving up other alternatives can result in buyer’s 
remorse, or a sense of regret stemming from making the wrong choice, especially when 
the chosen individual turns out to be disappointing compared to his or her online profile 
(Heino, et al. 444). 
Access to many alternatives may also reframe how users think about fostering 
relationships. Users focus primarily on sorting through alternatives to find the perfect 
relationship, rather than focusing on ways to build the perfect relationship (Heino, et al. 
443). Through interviews with a diverse group of online daters, Heino, et al. (2010) 
discover that many people naturally speak about online dating using metaphors that relate 
their dating interactions to economic transactions. All subjects are asked these two 
questions during their interviews: (1) “Has the knowledge that there are thousands of 
profiles available online changed the way you go about dating? If yes, how?” and (2) 
“Has it changed the way you view those you might potentially date? If yes, how? (Heino, 
et al. 433).” They find that people relate online dating to shopping, comparing online 
platforms to supermarkets and catalogs. They argue that this perception fosters a “search” 
mentality, as opposed to a “build” mentality, deemphasizing emotional connections and 
discouraging the development of attachment to a potential partner (Heino, et al 443).  
 
II. The Existence of the Endowment Effect 
The endowment effect, or the tendency to overvalue goods purely based on 
ownership, has been  confirmed repeatedly through experimental methods. Variations of 
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one main experimental approach dominate the large body of literature on the endowment 
effect. Pioneering this approach, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) observe the 
effect through valuation gaps between buyers and sellers. To observe valuation gaps, they 
randomly split subjects into two groups: sellers and buyers. They give each seller a coffee 
mug, and ask them to state the lowest price they would be willing to accept (WTA) in 
order to sell the mug. They leave the buyers empty-handed, and then ask them to state the 
highest price they would each be willing to pay (WTP) to acquire a mug. The endowment 
effect exists in the discrepancy between average WTA and WTP, where Kahneman, et. 
al., found the seller’s willingness to accept is, in general, more than twice as high as the 
buyers’ willingness to pay (Kahneman 296). These results are replicated across several 
other traditional goods, such as binoculars, pens, and chocolate bars (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, Thaler 1335). Although this method provides robust and replicable results, it 
relies on people’s judgements about their willingness to make exchanges, without 
actually observing their true behavior. For example, someone might state that $5 is the 
lowest price they would be willing to accept for a coffee mug, but then might actually 
end up selling it for $4.50. Even so, measuring valuation gaps does effectively quantify 
the endowment effect, allowing us to compare the effect’s magnitude across goods, 
demographics, and situations. 
Valuation gap experiments have also been successfully applied to the dating 
market, showing that results from experiments administered in traditional markets can be 
replicated in non-traditional markets. Nataf and Wallsten (2013) study the valuation gap 
between “buyers” and “sellers” in the dating market using contact information associated 
with different dating profiles as the good in question. To motivate their experimental 
design, they cite experiments showing that loss aversion is not limited to traditional 
markets, such as the market for coffee mugs. Experiments involving the buying and 
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selling of carbon emissions, wildlife reserves and hunting licenses all demonstrate 
endowment effects that are larger than those exhibited in traditional market experiments 
(Nataf andWallsten 3). Some suggest that the larger WTA/WTP ratios stem from non-
traditional markets having more ambiguous pricing than their non-traditional 
counterparts. These large endowment effects are also explained by variation in the 
evolutionary salience of the goods. Brosnan and Jones (2008) argue that the endowment 
effect should be stronger in markets for goods that are more necessary from an 
evolutionary perspective (Brosnan and Jones 1968). This might not explain the high 
endowment effect in the markets for carbon emissions and wildlife reserves, but hunting 
rights and mating choices would seemingly trump all traditional consumer goods markets 
in terms of evolutionary relevance. Given this line of reasoning, it makes sense that Nataf 
and Wallsten (2013) observe a large endowment effect in the market for dating 
opportunities. As this paper builds largely on the work of Nataf and Wallsten, I expect to 
find a similar result.  
Nataf and Wallsten find that the endowment effect does exist in the dating 
market, but that there are considerable differences in the magnitude of the effect between 
men and women. Men display similar levels of loss aversion in the dating market  as they 
do in markets for traditional goods (i.e. WTA/WTP ⋍ 2), whereas women display levels 
of loss aversion around four times higher in the dating market (Nataf and Wallsten 9). 
Overall, Nataf and Wallsten (2013), provide strong evidence that the endowment effect 
exists in the dating market. Following their basic design, I created an experiment to test 
whether the endowment effect differs between people who are presented with many 
dating opportunities and those who are presented with only one.  
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III. Theories of the Endowment Effect 
Much of the literature surrounding the psychology of online dating suggests that 
a plethora of options causes people to attribute less value to individual dating 
opportunities. This effect alone, however,  does not imply anything about the magnitude 
of the endowment effect. If, due to an increase in dating opportunities, both single and 
matched people devalue dating opportunities to the same degree, the endowment effect 
would stay the same across traditional and online dating scenarios. This paper examines 
how a dating market with many options systematically affects both single people, who 
have a chance to obtain a date, differently from matched people, who have the chance of 
losing a date.  If the presence of many alternatives affects people with different 
perspectives (single or matched) on the dating market differently, it will affect the 
magnitude of the endowment effect in the dating market.  
The most common and widely accepted explanation for the endowment effect, 
the hypothesis that people ascribe more value to things merely because they own them, is 
the idea that people are inherently loss-averse, meaning people weigh the disutility 
brought about by a loss more heavily than they weigh the utility brought about by an 
equivalent gain. Chapman, et al. (2017), however, emphasize the importance of other 
cognitive, emotional, attentional, and social processes involved in both buying and selling 
in understanding the endowment effect. Their evidence suggests that modeling 
transactions as gains and losses and attributing the endowment effect to general loss 
aversion falls unacceptably short of explaining the phenomenon (Chapman, et al. 3). This 
section synthesizes the economic and psychological theories that explain loss aversion 
and describes other factors that might contribute to the magnitude of the observed 
endowment effect. Based on an understanding of these factors, I predict the number of 
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alternatives will alter psychological processes, resulting in people with many dating 
alternatives displaying less loss aversion than people with no dating alternatives.   
 
A. Economic Theory 
(1) Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), aims to describe 
human decision making under risk. Because prospect theory encompasses several 
widespread psychological phenomena, including the endowment effect, the theory is 
consistent with many experimental findings that its predecessor, expected utility theory, 
fails to explain (Kahneman, Tversky 1041). Two key elements of prospect theory, 
reference dependence and loss aversion, explain the existence of the endowment effect.  
i. Reference Dependence 
 Prospect theory (Kahneman 278) claims that people actually judge value based 
on gains and losses from a reference point, not simply as a function of final states (i.e. 
total wealth). This reference point usually represents one’s “current asset position” 
(Kahneman, Tversky 274). Illustrated at the origin on the graph below, the reference 
point reflects the status quo, a person’s expectations, and the outcome to which a person 
feels entitled. A person assesses value, or utility, based not on his/her/their final state, but 
on how the person’s asset position deviates, either positively (gain) or negatively (loss) 
from his/her/their reference point. 
ii. Loss Aversion 
The value curve is kinked at the reference point and is steeper over losses than 
over gains. This represents the conjecture that people weigh losses more heavily than 
equivalent gains. The endowment effect is portrayed below by the discrepancy between 
one’s willingness to pay (WTP), defined as the highest price they are willing to pay to 
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acquire a good, and their willingness to accept (WTA), defined as the lowest price they 
are willing to accept to sell it. As portrayed in Figure 1, WTA, the absolute value of V(-
1) is greater than WTP, the absolute value of V(1).  This contradicts the neoclassical 
assumption that mere ownership has no effect on the value of goods or wealth (List 1).  
 
Figure 1. A diagram of the Value Function, showing reference-dependence and loss aversion.  
 
 
While prospect theory has more explanatory power than its predecessor, expected utility 
theory, it offers no direct prediction for how access to many alternatives or substitutes in 
a market affects the slope of the value curve. To better understand the nature of loss 
aversion, it is necessary to explore deeper psychological explanations for the endowment 
effect. 
B. Psychological Theory 
Ericson and Fuster (2013) argue that a variety of psychological mechanisms 
contribute to the endowment effect, including three theories which are instrumental in 
developing this paper’s hypothesis: (1) motivated taste change; (2) attachment; and (3) 
cognitive perspective. In order to analyze what happens to the magnitude of the 
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endowment effect when the number of dating options increases, it is important to 
consider how the number of alternatives affects people on the buying (date acquisition) 
side and selling (date retention) side differently. 
(1) Motivated Taste Change2 
The theory of motivated taste change suggests that people genuinely value 
objects they own more highly than objects they are not associated with, which makes it 
more painful to lose an object than it was beneficial to gain it in the first place (Ericson, 
Fuster 23). One explanation for this effect is that people see possessions as an extension 
of self, and therefore see their own possessions in a better light due to self-serving biases3 
(Beggan 234). This is potentially relevant in the dating market because evidence suggests 
the theory of motivated taste change applies not only to objects in a person’s possession, 
but also to people in a person’s social circle. For example, Beggan (1992) shows that 
even being slightly acquainted with another person will inflate one’s opinion of that 
person (Beggan 235). In the online dating market, learning about many alternatives at 
once may limit the effect of motivated taste change by deflating the extent to which a 
user values each individual match. This force applies to the selling (date retention) side. It 
drives WTA valuations down, shrinking the WTA-WTP gap. For this reason, I expect the 
endowment effect to be weaker in an online dating scenario with many alternatives than it 
would be in a traditional dating scenario with no alternatives.  
(2) Attachment 
Connolly and Reb (2007), Carmon, Wertenbroch and Zeelenberg (2003), and 
Ericson and Fuster (2013) all argue that the development of some sort of connection or 
attachment to an object affects its value. Like motivated taste change, the attachment 
                                                
2 Ericson and Fuster (2013) use the term “motivated taste change” to refer to the tendency for 
people to value possessed items more highly because they associate these objects with themselves. 
3 Self-serving bias refers to the human tendency to view oneself and one’s own actions and 
associations favorably.  
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theory of loss aversion provides a possible explanation for why losses can feel so painful 
(Ericson, Fuster 25). Connolly and Reb (2007) compare the effects of subjective 
ownership against those of factual ownership. They find that physical possession of an 
object, or subjective ownership, leads to stronger feelings of ownership and triggers a 
stronger endowment effect. Factual ownership, on the other hand, when subjects are 
simply told they have ownership, results in a weaker endowment effect (Connolly, Reb 
107). When applied to the dating market, it follows that relationships characterized by 
actual face-to-face interactions are likely to foster more feelings of attachment than 
relationships built online. The process of online dating may restrict, or at least delay, 
emotional attachment. 
 This lack of attachment is not solely due to the online interface and messaging 
systems associated with dating platforms; the access to many potential dates brought 
about by online dating also limits attachment. As discussed above, the objectification of 
people resulting from seeing each person in the context of many alternatives can reduce 
feelings of attachment to a single option. The “search” mentality, stimulated by a large 
number of options, also deemphasizes emotional connections with a potential partner, 
therefore limiting feelings of attachment. When there are more alternatives, this force 
should drive valuations down on both the buying (date acquisition) side and the selling 
(date retention) side. I expect, however, the lack of attachment formed in markets with 
many alternatives to affect WTA valuations more. Thus, having many alternatives should 
shrink the WTA-WTP gap. Again, I expect the endowment effect to be weaker in an 
online dating scenario (many alternatives) than in a traditional dating scenario (no 
alternatives).  
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(3) Cognitive Perspective 
The endowment effect may also be attributed to differences in cognitive 
perspective between buyers and sellers (Ariely and Carmon 360). Buyers focus on the 
money they are giving up to gain an item, while sellers focus on the item they are giving 
up to gain money. This fundamental discrepancy in perspective could account for 
differences in valuations between buyers and sellers4 (Ariely and Carmon 361). 
Hanemann (1991) suggests that goods that are more substitutable have a weaker 
endowment effect.5 Ariely and Carmon (2000) explain this finding by characterizing 
substitutability as a trait of the good in question, which is more salient to the seller 
(Ariely and Carmon 369). If someone sees their possession as irreplaceable, they will be 
less willing to give it up. In the dating market, online dating increases the apparent 
substitutability of potential partners. Therefore, the endowment effect should be weaker 
in an online dating scenario.  
In summary, the existing literature provides strong evidence that viewing options 
in the context of alternatives fundamentally changes the way people perceive their value, 
and there is no reason to believe that these effects are not operative in the dating market. 
These psychological factors affect the value placed on opportunities by people trying to 
retain dating opportunities more than the value placed on opportunities by people trying 
to acquire dating opportunities. The visibility of alternatives reduces the value of 
individual dating opportunities, but more so for people on the “selling” side (WTA).   
 
                                                
4 Ariely and Carmon (2000) provide experimental evidence for this claim using college basketball 
tickets. They run a series of valuation gap experiments, manipulating the focus of both buyers and 
sellers (from the opportunity cost of the expenditure to the benefits of attending the game and vice 
versa), tracking the effect on valuation. 
5  Hanemann (1991) cites Yosemite National Park as an example of a public good with no private 
good substitutes. He analyzes that, without substitutes, there is nothing to bind the WTA-WTP 
gap. 
 15 
C. When the Endowment Effect Grows Stronger 
The level of observed loss aversion differs depending on the situation. For 
example, Nataf and Wallsten (2013) find that the value curve is steeper in the loss 
domain in the dating market than in more traditional markets (e.g., the market for coffee 
mugs, candy bars, etc.). They attribute this to two factors:  type of good and evolution. 
With evidence from markets for public, non-market, ordinary, and private goods, 
Horowitz and McConnell (2002) find that as a good gets further from being a traditional 
private good, the endowment effect grows stronger6 . This supports the possibility that 
the lack of a clear, known price in the market for dating opportunities may result in a 
higher observed endowment effect. People may see dating opportunities as difficult to put 
a price on, resulting in a large gap between low WTP valuations and high WTA 
valuations. To illustrate, consider the extreme case where no endowment effect arises: 
when the good in question is a $10 bill.  Since everyone knows that the “market value” of 
a $10 bill is $10, the willingness to accept and willingness to pay are both $10 in the case.  
That is, there is no endowment effect.  When a good is not traded in markets, the market 
value is much more ambiguous and, as a result, the difference between WTA and WTP 
are more likely to emerge.     
Brosnan and Jones (2008) observe the endowment effect in chimpanzees, finding 
support for the notion that the relative overvaluing of possessions is a biological trait. 
They also find that the magnitude of the effect varies across goods, not randomly, but 
systematically. Objects with more evolutionary relevance7, in general, stimulate a 
stronger endowment effect (Brosnan and Jones 1968). The dating market is of high 
evolutionary significance, which might explain why Nataf and Wallsten (2013) find that 
                                                
6 Horowitz, McConnell cite chocolates and movie tickets as traditional private goods and ocean 
piers and home postal delivery as public/non-market goods. 
7 Objects of greater evolutionary relevance include food, shelter, mating opportunities. Objects of 
lesser evolutionary relevance include consumer goods, such as coffee mugs.  
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the value curve is steeper in the loss domain in the dating market than in more traditional 
markets.  
Nataf and Wallsten (2013) also observe significant gender differences in loss 
aversion in the dating market, noting that females are more loss averse than males. They 
attribute this to the possibility that men view the dating market as more competitive than 
women, possibly due to evolved mating mentalities. From an evolutionary perspective, 
men who developed too strong of an attachment to mates reduced their opportunity to 
have more children. This is not the case for women, who can only give birth once every 
nine months and who benefit from stable partners who can help raise children (Nataf, 
Wallsten 14). In addition to this evolutionary perspective predicting observed gender 
differences, it also leads me to expect a weaker endowment effect in a situation with 
many alternatives. The situation with no alternatives more closely resembles our 
evolutionary past where mating/dating opportunities were relatively scarce (i.e., hundreds 
of dating opportunities were not available at the click of button). The access to many 
alternatives leads us away from the setting in which our ancestors evolved. 
 
D. When the Endowment Effect Disappears 
 The endowment effect is prevalent in many markets, across many goods, but 
there are also situations when the effect is not observed. The most obvious case of this, 
originally cited by Kahneman and Tversky (1991), is with currency itself as discussed 
above. Loss aversion is not present in the trade of a $100 bill for $100 in another liquid 
form because the market value is so known and so accepted that people value the options 
the same regardless of their perspective. For this reason, Kahneman and Tversky (1991) 
argue that loss aversion should not be present in “routine commercial transactions” 
(Kahneman, Tversky 1055).  
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In addition, List (2003) finds that the endowment effect in collectible card 
trading markets disappears for experienced traders. There are two reasons why this result 
may occur. First, as Kahneman, et al. (1990) point out , the endowment effect does not 
exist when a good is purchased temporarily, or for resale (Kahneman, et al. 1328). A 
consumer’s intention to buy a product for an indefinite period of time differs from a 
“trader’s” intention to buy a product for the purpose of resale, just as people’s intentions 
differ in the dating market. Some people actively look for temporary arrangements, such 
as one-night stands, whereas others search for dating opportunities that may turn into 
lasting, committed relationships. Second, List (2003) demonstrates that those with market 
experience learn to overcome loss aversion, parting with possessions easily. Somewhat 
surprisingly, market experience in card trading also limits loss aversion in markets for 
consumer goods such as coffee mugs (List 25). Given these findings, I expect that 
experience in the dating market or in the online dating market may also affect levels of 
loss aversion for dating opportunities. This study tests for these effects,  by collecting 
information on subjects’ dating intentions and market experience.  
 
E. Expectations and Hypotheses 
 In this study, I manipulate the number of number of potential dating 
opportunities available to each subject. People either see several profiles or just one 
profile. Presenting a subject with many simultaneous opportunities imitates an online 
dating scenario. Simultaneous access to many alternatives is a key feature of any online 
dating platform that rarely, if ever, occurs in a natural offline environment. The 
abundance of alternatives signifies a thicker market, allowing the subject to compare 
many choices simultaneously. Alternatively, presenting a subject with only one 
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opportunity simulates a more traditional dating scenario. In this environment, potential 
dating opportunities arise randomly and less frequently, and are  evaluated individually, 
without reference to alternatives. 
 
Theory/Explanation When the Number of Options ↑, 
the Endowment Effect... 
Systematic Differences in  
Loss Aversion 
Prospect Theory - - 
Motivated Taste Change ↓ - 
Attachment ↓ - 
Cognitive Perspective ↓ - 
Evolution ↓ Male → Endowment Effect ↓ 
Dating Intentions   
- 
Prefers Casual/Short-Term 
Relationships →  
Endowment Effect ↓ 
Dating Experience  
- 
More experienced with dating 
and online dating → 
Endowment Effect ↓ 
Table 1. Summary of expected results predicted by each theoretical explanation. 
 
 
I expect that the number of alternatives will alter people’s psychological 
processes, causing people with many alternatives to display less loss aversion than people 
with no alternatives. Being presented with many options, signifying a more liquid dating 
market, should put a subject into joint evaluation mode, evaluating his/her/their options 
against one another. This is more cognitively difficult than separate, individual 
evaluations and can lead to the objectification and commodification of options in the 
dating market (Finkel et al. 32). It also limits how highly people value each individual 
option. In addition, access to many options can put people in “search” mode (Heino, et al. 
443), where they are focused on finding the perfect relationship through comparing 
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options, rather than building an emotional connection with a single option. This limits 
attachment to any single person, therefore limiting loss aversion. This result is illustrated 
in Figure 2 by the flatter slope of the curve corresponding to a situation with many 
alternatives. 
  
 
Figure 2. The hypothesized difference in the endowment effect between a market with many dating 
alternatives and a market with no dating alternatives, following from the implications of several 
theoretical explanations.  
 
Displaying a multitude of options makes the alternatives salient to subjects. The 
cognitive perspective theory suggests this could affect how all people value dating 
opportunities. People on the buying/date acquisition side, who are focused more on what 
they must give up to pursue a dating opportunity, may value each single dating 
opportunity less when it is presented as one of many alternatives (Ariely and Carmon 
360). People on the selling/date retention side, who are focused more on the traits of their 
match, will see their match as more substitutable when they are aware of alternatives. 
This will lead people on the date retention side to value each dating opportunity less. 
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Cognitive perspective theory suggests that the latter force, affecting the selling side, is 
stronger than that on the buying side, predicting a weaker endowment effect in a thicker 
market.  
Again, this result is illustrated in Figure 2 by a slight decrease in willingness to 
pay (WTP), corresponding to how people on the date acquisition side value dating 
opportunities, and a more extreme decrease in willingness to accept (WTA), 
corresponding to how people on the date retention side value dating opportunities. If 
having many alternatives limits the effects of motivated taste change and attachment 
and/or changes the perceived thickness of the dating market, I would expect to see a 
weaker endowment effect in the market with more alternatives. I would not expect to see 
this result if subjects do not experience any motivated taste change or attachment during 
the duration of the experiment and if the number of alternatives does not fundamentally 
affect the way people evaluate (i.e. joint versus separate evaluation) their options and 
view the market.  
I would also expect people who are interested in more casual or short-term 
relationships to display less loss aversion compared to people interested in more serious 
or long-term relationships, and for people with less dating experience to display more 
loss aversion than those with more experience.  
 
IV. Experimental Design 
 Based largely on the work of Nataf and Wallsten (2013), and in collaboration 
with my colleague, Joe Trier, I developed an original experiment designed to answer the 
following question: how does access to many simultaneous and comparable dating 
opportunities brought about by online dating affect loss-aversion in the dating market? 
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 To collect data, I sent an online survey (see appendix for more detailed 
information) to college students in my social network between the ages of 18-23. I chose 
this demographic because nearly all young adults are familiar with the concept and 
language of online dating. In addition, previous research supports the finding of an 
endowment effect in the dating market for young adults (Nataf and Wallsten).  
I created the survey using Qualtrics and distributed it to college students across 
the country through Facebook and email. A significant portion of the data comes from 
Macalester College. Pictures of hypothetical dates are taken legally from Pexels, a 
website that offers a wide variety of portraits representative of those included in dating 
profiles. I chose five male and five female pictures, selected only for their age similarity. 
Pulling inspiration and content from the popular dating platforms, Tinder and Bumble, 
my colleague and I built hypothetical dating profiles for each of the photos, including 
name, age, college major, and a short biography, mimicking the style of online dating 
profiles. 
At the end of the online survey, participants were asked for basic demographic 
information, including age, gender, and sexuality. Apart from this information, 
participants were anonymous. 
I used a between-subject design for the experiment, separating subjects and 
comparing average results between different treatments. Participants (n =199) were 
randomly assigned into four distinct groups. First, they were separated into two 
conditions: (1) date acquisition or (2) date retention. Participants assigned to the date 
acquisition condition, which parallels the buying condition from standard endowment 
effect experiments, represent single people in search of some sort of relationship. 
Participants in the date retention condition parallel the selling condition from standard 
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endowment effect experiments, representing people who already have a dating 
opportunity and are considering giving it up.  
Participants from each condition were then randomly assigned to one of two 
treatment groups: the many alternatives group (five potential dates) or the no alternatives 
group (one potential date). The many alternatives treatment is meant to mimic an online 
dating situation. The no alternatives treatment represents a traditional dating situation, 
where prospects are evaluated separately. 
After separating subjects by gender of interest, condition, and treatment, there are 
eight divisions of subjects: 
 
 Date Acquisition / Buy Side Date Retention / Sell Side 
For people attracted to 
cisgender males (Many 
Alternatives) 
Survey Version 1 Survey Version 3 
For people attracted to 
cisgender males (No 
Alternatives) 
Survey Version 2 Survey Version 4 
For people attracted to 
cisgender females (Many 
Alternatives) 
Survey Version 5 Survey Version 6 
For people attracted to 
cisgender females (No 
Alternatives) 
Survey Version 7 Survey Version 8 
Table 2. Description of subject groupings and survey assignments. Cisgender refers to subjects 
whose sense of identity corresponds to their sex at birth. 
 
 
A. Procedure 
Regardless of treatment or condition, every participant was asked to place a 
dollar value on a specific dating opportunity. Modeling this aspect of the methodology 
after Nataf and Wallsten’s (2013) experiment, the only restriction on the dollar amount 
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that participants can enter is that it must be greater than zero. While potentially creating 
large outliers, this approach avoids the risk of bias created by anchoring subjects’ 
valuations. Nevertheless, I do filter the data for some outliers which I discuss below.  
People assigned to the date acquisition condition were shown a gender 
appropriate profile, either by itself or in the context of other alternatives. They were told 
that each of the people in the profiles had shown interest in them, but that they had no 
way to contact any of the “matches.” They were asked, “How much are you willing to 
pay for the ability to contact the person in question?” All people who are attracted to 
cisgender males in both the many alternatives treatment and the no alternatives treatment 
evaluated the same profile(s). All people who are attracted to cisgender females in both 
the many alternatives treatment and the no alternatives treatment evaluated the same 
profile(s).  
People assigned to the date retention condition were shown a gender appropriate 
profile and told that they could contact the person in question. They see the profile either 
by itself, or in the context of other alternatives. They were asked, “What’s the lowest 
amount of money you are willing to accept in order to give up the ability to contact this 
person?” All people who are attracted to cisgender males in both the many alternatives 
treatment and the no alternatives treatment evaluated the same profile(s). All people who 
are attracted to cisgender females in both the many alternatives treatment and the no 
alternatives treatment evaluated the same profile(s).  
At the end of the survey, people are asked to answer a series of questions. They 
provide information on their gender, race, college major, relationship status, sexuality, 
dating experience, online dating experience, other market experience, and relationship 
preferences (i.e. casual/temporary or serious/longer term). They are also asked about how 
well they were able to put themselves in the mindset of being single and searching for a 
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date. People who said they were not able to get into this mindset, due to being in a 
committed relationship or other reasons, were excluded from the results.  
 
B. Limiting Bias 
 Since I did not present subjects with real dating opportunities, nothing is truly at 
stake using this experimental design, thus introducing hypothetical bias, or bias which 
occurs when people are not spending and receiving actual money. However, there is no 
reason to believe that hypothetical bias would affect each treatment group differently. To 
make the experiment as realistic as possible, I begin the experiment by providing subjects 
with some context to put them in the necessary state of mind (i.e., “For the purposes of 
this survey you are single and in search of a date”). I attempt to make the situation as 
realistic as possible by using language and profile formats that mimic the design of 
popular online dating platforms for the subject age group. I present all profiles as 
“matches,” implying that the people in these profiles have all shown some level of 
interest in the subject.   
While administering our experiment as an online survey allowed us to reach 
many more subjects, I was not able to control the environment as well as I would have 
been able to in a lab experiment. I combatted this limitation by measuring the time people 
took to answer questions, ensuring that people took the survey in one sitting with no 
major breaks.  
 This experimental design also created the potential for non-response bias. Since 
no one was forced to participate in the study, there is a risk that our self-selected sample 
does not accurately reflect the population. I attempted to mitigate this risk by making the 
survey as short as possible.  
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V. Results 
 
A. Summary Statistics 
 The sample (n=199) consists of young adults (age 18-23) drawn mainly from 
Macalester College. The sample is 65% female and 35% male. The charts in Figure 3 
show the gender breakdown for each treatment group. Looking at relationship preference, 
22% of people in the sample prefer casual short-term relationships compared to 78% who 
prefer serious-long term relationships. In addition, 55% of people in the sample reported 
having no experience with online dating while 45% of people reported having at least 
some online dating experience. I found that 68% of men and 82% of women in the 
sample, respectively, prefer serious, long-term relationships to short-term casual 
relationships. Around 44% of men and 46% of women reported having experience with 
online dating.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to each of the four treatment groups. With a 
large enough sample size, I would expect the breakdown of the sample by each control 
variable to converge to the true population statistics, therefore becoming consistent across 
each treatment group. As shown in Figure 3 below, the treatment groups are statistically 
similar.  
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 No Alternatives Many Alternatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 
Acquisition 
(WTP) 
n=55 
 
20.4% prefer casual short-term 
relationships 
79.6% prefer serious, long-term 
relationships 
 
60.0% have never used online dating 
40.0% have used online dating 
 
n=51 
15.7% prefer casual short-term relationships 
84.3% prefer serious, long-term relationships 
 
54.9% have never used online dating 
45.1% have used online dating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 
Retention 
(WTA) 
n=47 
 
21.3% prefer casual short-term 
relationships 
78.7% prefer serious, long-term 
relationships 
 
46.8% have never used online dating 
53.2% have used online dating 
n=46
 
32.6% prefer casual short-term relationships 
67.4% prefer serious, long-term relationships 
 
58.7% have never used online dating 
41.3% have used online dating 
Figure 3. Breakdown of each treatment group by key control variables ( i.e. gender, relationship 
preference, and online dating experience). 
 
 
B. Outliers 
I was not able to complete any analysis without removing outliers, as some high 
outliers exceeded $1,000,000, skewing the data immensely. I chose to eliminate outliers 
by separating the valuations from each treatment group and using the standard rule for 
identifying outliers. That is, I calculated the interquartile range of each group, and 
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eliminated any data point more than 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third 
quartile. I also tried using different cutoff points and applying them across all treatment 
groups. The results stayed the same, but lost some significance. This method also caused 
an issue. Using a cutoff of $80 as the maximum valuation, 10 outliers would be removed 
from the WTA / No Alternatives group, four outliers from the WTA / Many Alternatives 
group, and only one from both WTP groups combined. Eliminating 10 outliers from one 
treatment group means eliminating one fifth of the data from that group.   
 
C. Main Results 
The results shown in Table 3 suggest that willingness to pay (WTP) does not 
differ significantly between the no alternatives treatment and the many alternatives 
treatment, but willingness to accept (WTA) does, resulting in a stronger endowment 
effect in the dating market with less alternatives.  
n = 199 No 
Alternatives 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Many 
Alternatives 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
WTP $2.63 [$1.73, $3.53] $2.49  [$1.45, $3.53] 
WTA $23.85 [$15.27, $32.43] $10.28 [$6.75, $13.83] 
WTA/WTP 9.6  3.9  
 
Table 3. Average WTP and average WTA for the ‘no alternatives’ and ‘many alternatives’ groups.  
 
When shown just one potential date, willingness to pay for the ability to contact 
one match averaged $2.49, with a standard error of $0.45. Willingness to accept averaged 
$23.85, with a standard error of $4.38. The observed endowment effect in this market 
was high, with average willingness to accept being 9.6 times higher than the average 
willingness to pay.  
When shown several potential dates, average willingness to pay for the ability to 
contact one match averages just under $2.63, with a standard error of $0.52. This WTP 
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valuation does not differ significantly from the WTP valuation in the situation with only 
one option. Willingness to accept, however, averages $10.28 with a standard error of 
$1.81. The observed endowment effect when provided with many alternative options was 
significantly lower than in the case with fewer options, with average willingness to accept 
being just 3.9 times higher than the average willingness to pay. Even in this situation, the 
observed endowment effect is around twice as large as usual observed endowment effects 
in more traditional markets, such as the market for coffee mugs.  
Figure 3 shows the main result visually.  
 
Figure 3. Difference in the WTA and WTP between treatment groups. Whisker bars show one 
standard error. 
 
Not only are the WTA valuations higher than the WTP valuations in each group, 
they are also more varied. Bounded below by a zero value, the data from each treatment 
group is right-skewed. The WTA valuations are more skewed because there are more 
occurrences of high valuations. Even after removing high outliers, WTA valuations were 
 29 
more varied. This may be explained by individual variation in the experience of the 
psychological phenomena in play. Some subjects may be more prone to loss aversion 
than others.  
 
D. Differences in the Endowment Effect 
 
Figure 4. Magnitude of the endowment effect (measured by the WTA/WTP ratio) in a market with 
many dating alternatives contrasted with the magnitude of the endowment effect in a market with 
no alternatives.  
 
Figure 4 shows the magnitude of the endowment effect in the market with no 
alternatives and the market with many alternatives. In each situation, it is relatively high 
when compared to the generally accepted WTA/WTP ratio in markets for more 
traditional goods, which is around 2.2. The endowment effect in the situation with no 
alternatives (WTA/WTP = 9.6) is larger than the endowment effect in the situation with 
many alternatives (WTA/WTP = 3.9).  
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To test if this difference in the endowment effect is significant, I use a hypothesis 
test for the difference in means between treatment groups where the variables of interest 
are: 
 
WTAOne  = average WTA valuation of people who saw a single profile  
WTPOne = average WTP valuation of people who saw a single profile  
WTAMany = average WTA valuation of people who saw many profiles 
WTPMany= average WTP valuation of people who saw many profiles 
 
 
If the number options does not influence the endowment effect, then the 
difference between the willingness to accept and willingness to pay should be the same 
no matter how many profiles the subjects saw.  More formally, I test the following 
hypothesis: 
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference between the endowment effect in a market with 
many options and a market with few options.  
Ho: (WTAOne - WTPOne) - (WTAMany - WTPMany) = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis: The endowment effect in the market with few options is 
stronger than the endowment effect in the market with many options. 
HA:  (WTAOne - WTPOne) - (WTAMany - WTPMany) > 0 
 
To test this hypothesis, I ran the following regression: 
 
(1) Valuation =  β0 + β1*ValuationType + β2*NumberOfOptions + β3*ValuationType*NumberOfOptions 
 
where Valuation is the dollar amount subjects reported and ValuationType distinguishes 
whether the valuation is WTA or WTP.  The latter is coded as 0 if WTP and 1 if WTA. 
Therefore, I expect β1 to be positive, (WTA valuations are higher) if there is an 
endowment effect. NumberOfOptions distinguishes whether the valuation was made in 
the face of many options or one option. It is coded as 0 if many options and 1 if one 
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option.  I expect β2 to be positive, as valuations made when given only one option are 
higher. The interaction term allows us to distinguish between valuations in the WTA/No 
Alternatives group and valuations in other groups. I expect β3 to be positive if the 
WTA/No Alternatives group has the highest valuations. This is what I expect if my 
theory is correct and providing subjects with more dating profiles lowers the endowment 
effect.  
 
Dependent Variable: Valuation ($) (n=199) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
Valuation Type 
(0 if WTP, 1 if WTA) 
7.65** 3.25 
Number of Options 
(0 if many, 1 if one) 
0.23 3.11 
Valuation Type * Number of Options 
(Interaction) 
13.34*** 4.54 
* if p < 0.10, ** if p < 0.05, *** if p < 0.01   
 
Table 4. Results from testing the difference between WTA and WTP valuations across treatment 
groups.  
 
Table 4 provides the regression results for the equation (1).   The coefficient on 
valuation type dummy is positive and significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level.  This indicates, as expected and seen in Figures 3 and 4 above, that the willingness 
to accept was higher than willingness to pay. That is, β1 is positive providing evidence of 
the endowment effect. The second line of Table 4 shows that β1 is also positive, but 
insignificantly different from zero.  This indicates, somewhat surprisingly, that the 
valuations were not significantly different across the no versus five alternative profile 
treatments. Finally, the third row shows that β3 is positive and significantly different from 
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zero at the five percent level.  This indicates that the subjects provided the highest 
valuation when they saw one profile and were asked to provider their willingness to pay.  
In other words, the willingness to accept was significantly lower when the subjects saw 
many alternatives.  This finding is consistent with the theory put forth in this paper.   
 
D. Effect of Control Variables On Valuations 
 As discussed above, theory and previous work suggests that willingness to pay 
and accept might also be influenced by dating experience, preferences for short- versus 
long-term relationships and gender. To examine systematic differences between groups 
of people, I ran Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to examine the relationships 
between WTA and WTP valuations and the number of dating options presented (one or 
five), the participant’s sex (male or female), the participant’s relationship preference 
(short-term, casual or long-term, serious), and the participant’s online dating experience 
(none or some). 
Table 5 shows several interesting results for willing to accept. It displays that as 
the number of dating options goes from five to one, the average willingness to accept 
rises by $13.57. This result is significant at the 0.05 level and consistent with what we 
saw in Table 4.  What is important to note is that this result remains significant when 
controls are used, with a coefficient of $12.28, affirming that the treatment groups are 
statistically similar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Accept ($) (n=93) 
Variable Reg 1 Std. Err. Reg 2 Std. Err. Reg 3 Std. Err. 
Number of Options 
(0 if many, 1 if one) 
13.57** 4.77 12.85** 4.80 12.28** 4.90 
Sex 
(0 if female, 1 if male) 
- - - - .61 5.18 
Relationship Preference 
(0 if serious, 1 if casual) 
- - -6.38 5.41 -6.78 5.52 
Online Dating Experience 
(0 if none, 1 if some) 
- - - - 3.29 3.84 
* if p < 0.10, ** if  
p < 0.05, *** if p < 0.01 
      
 
Table 5. The relationship between number of options, sex, relationship preference, online dating 
experience, and WTA valuations.  
 
Second, the results do not show the gender difference in willingness to accept 
valuations observed by Nataf and Wallsten’s (2013). Nataf and Wallsten find that 
females are more loss-averse than males when it comes to dating opportunities, reporting 
significantly higher willingness to accept (WTA) valuations on average. My failure to 
replicate this result could be due to bias in the sample, drawing most subjects from a very 
progressive liberal arts institution. In contrast, Nataf and Wallsten ran their experiment at 
a large state school, University of Maryland. My result could also reflect increasing 
normalization of female independence in society since Nataf and Wallsten’s results were 
published in 2013. In modern society, especially among a progressive, college-educated 
population, females have become less reliant on romantic relationships to move out of the 
house and transition to adulthood (Ansari 123). This cultural shift could counteract the 
evolutionary explanation for gender difference provided by Nataf and Wallsten. Recall, 
they argue that the gender differences could be due to females having a larger role in 
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birthing and raising children. In contrast, males, because they are wired with the 
evolutionary instinct to pass on their genes , optimize by having many partners and fewer 
attachments. As the cultural focus of young adults is directed away from having children 
at younger ages, and more toward independent career development, we would expect 
these gender differences to dissolve.  
Third, I found that relationship preference had a negative coefficient as expected. 
People who prefer casual, short term relationships have, on average, WTA valuations 
$6.78 lower than their long-term relationship-seeking counterparts (see Reg 3). While 
this result is not significant at the 0.05 level. It supports the supposition that people who 
think about ownership as temporary display less loss aversion than those who think about 
ownership as potentially permanent (Kahneman, et al. 1328; List, 5). A larger sample 
size, including more subjects with a preference for short-term, casual relationships may 
strengthen this finding.  
I did not find a significant relationship between the amount of online dating 
experience and WTA valuations. However, only 11 of the 199 included participants 
claimed to be regular users of online dating platforms, so I would not rule out the 
possibility of finding a correlation in a larger, more balanced sample.  
Table 6 contains the results of similar regressions using WTP valuations as the 
response variable, instead of WTA. As seen in Figure 3, WTP valuations did not vary 
based on the number of options presented to the participant. WTP valuations, on average, 
hovered between $2 and $3 for both experimental treatment groups: many alternatives 
and no alternatives. 
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Dependent Variable: Willingness to Pay ($) (n=106) 
Variable Reg 1 Std. Err. Reg 2 Std. Err. Reg 3 Std. Err. 
Number of Options 
(0 if many, 1 if new) 
0.22 0.76 0.17 0.78 0.13 0.81 
Sex 
(0 if female, 1 if male) 
- - - - 0.22 0.87 
Relationship Preference 
(0 if serious, 1 if casual) 
- - 0.27 1.06 0.42 1.12 
Online Dating Experience 
(Scale from 0-2) 
- - - - -0.04 0.73 
* if p < 0.10, ** if p < 0.05, 
 *** if p < 0.01 
      
 
Table 6. The relationship between number of options, sex, relationship preference, online dating 
experience, and WTP valuations.  
 
 
 As seen in Table 6, WTP does not change when the number of options changes 
regardless of which controls are used, confirming that the treatment groups are 
statistically similar. This speaks to the psychological impact of salient alternatives, 
suggesting that the presence of alternatives affects people faced with the opportunity for 
loss more than the people faced with the opportunity for equivalent gain.  
I did not observe any gender differences in WTP valuations. In addition, I did not 
observe differences in WTP valuations across people with different relationship 
preferences or across people with different amounts of online dating experience.  
 
VI. Discussion 
Although this experimental study supports a causal relationship between the 
number of available dating alternatives and the level of loss aversion people display in 
the dating market, one key question looms: how generalizable are these results to real 
world scenarios? 
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The most important consideration in evaluating this generalizability is the 
hypothetical nature of the experiment. I expect the hypothetical nature of the experiment 
to push both WTP and WTA valuations upwards from their true values.  Willingness to 
pay should be higher in the experiment due to the lack of a real budget constraint. While 
subjects were asked to pay for the ability to contact a match, it is easier to part with 
hypothetical currency than actual cash. Exaggerated WTA valuations stem from the 
participant’s perception of a money-making opportunity. When subjects were asked to 
state the lowest amount of money they would be willing to accept to give up the 
opportunity to contact one of their matches, they may have overstated their WTA for the 
chance to make more money from the opportunity. When confronted with an actual 
situation to sell contact information, given an offer from another party, WTA may fall.  
Given that WTP and WTA are both expected to be higher in the experiment than 
in real life, with no clear indication of the difference in the magnitude of these 
differences, the gap observed between WTP and WTA may actually be an accurate 
indicator of loss aversion in the real world. There is also no reason to believe the 
hypothetical bias would differ in magnitude between treatment groups. Even if the WTA 
and WTP values are skewed, the differences in loss aversion between treatment groups 
should not be biased.  
The nature of this randomized experiment also eliminates the possibility of 
examining how people value dating opportunities after the initial stages of finding and 
contacting a potential date. As people progress from evaluating potential dates to actually 
going on dates, the psychological theories considered predict that people will value their 
dating opportunities more and more highly as they develop a stronger association and 
attachment to any given opportunity. Therefore, the nature of this study may limit WTA 
valuations, as people experience only a short tenure with the matches, lacking face-to-
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face interaction and the opportunity to build an emotional connection. As a result,  this 
study may understate the level of loss aversion in the dating market.  
Finally, both the sample size and distribution of subjects in this study are possible 
sources of bias. A sample size of 200 college students most likely does not represent the 
entire dating market. Additionally, Macalester College students make up the majority of 
the sample, and while they are in the target demographic, the potential bias created by 
mainly using data from one campus environment could be eliminated by including a 
larger sample from a wide variety of colleges.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
This study provides evidence that access to an abundance of easily comparable 
available dating opportunities limits loss aversion in the dating market. It follows that an 
online dating environment can moderate the endowment effect in the dating market. This 
finding has both market and behavioral implications.  
Just as loss aversion can limit optimal trading in a competitive market, the 
existence of the endowment effect can create inefficiency in matching markets, such as 
the dating market. Consider the Gale-Shapley algorithm, a theoretical model which maps 
the process of reaching an equilibrium set of matches in a matching market. This model 
consists of two disjoint sets of agents. Each agent has preferences over the other set. In 
the heterosexual dating market, men make up one set and women make up the other. Men 
have preferences over women and women have preferences over men. In this model, it is 
assumed that agents’ ordinal preferences stay consistent throughout the entire matching 
process. Men and women enter in and out of matches until no one can leave their match 
to become better off (Dubins, Freedman 486). The endowment effect changes this result 
because people value others more highly once they enter a match with them. If this effect 
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is strong enough to shift agents’ ordinal preferences as they move into matches, the 
algorithm does not play out as anticipated. Matches are sticky, and this may prevent the 
market from reaching its same core set of matches.  
The endowment effect does not account for all of the stickiness we observe in the 
dating market. Some of this results from societal factors, such as the institution of 
marriage, the stigma surrounding divorce, etc.. However, if the existence of online dating 
limits loss aversion in the dating market, it allows the market to function closer to the 
predictions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. If experiencing happiness in a relationship 
depends heavily upon finding the perfect person to have a relationship with, access to 
dating opportunities brought about by online dating is beneficial: it gives everyone better 
odds for finding the perfect match. However, if experiencing happiness in a relationship 
depends more upon building the perfect relationship with a person, access to many 
opportunities may actually inhibit the achievement of utility-maximizing matches.  
 From a behavioral standpoint, if a dating market is saturated with easily 
comparable alternatives, and willingness to accept (WTA) valuations fall, it follows that 
people do not value their endowed dating opportunities as highly. As a result, people may 
not be willing to make as many sacrifices to maintain and retain relationships. 
Behaviorally, I would expect to see people allocate less effort to facilitating cooperation 
and compromise with their partners. Thicker dating markets may also lead to higher rates 
of breakups and even divorces, which may place added strain on friends and families. On 
the bright side, however, online dating platforms’ successful thickening of the dating 
market may play a role in empowering people to leave sub-optimal and even abusive 
relationships.  
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B. Statistical Analysis 
 
Stata Do File: 
/*wta regressions*/ 
reg wta dnopnew 
reg wta dnopnew dprefrelationship 
reg wta dnopnew dsex dprefrelationship donlinedatingexperience 
 
 
/*wtp regressions*/ 
reg wtp dnopnew 
reg wtp dnopnew dprefrelationship 
reg wtp dnopnew dsex dprefrelationship donlinedatingexperience 
 
/*difference in differences (significance of the difference in endowment effect)*/ 
gen interact=dval*dnopnew 
reg val dval dnopnew interact 
 
Difference in Difference of Means Regression. 
I determine the results are significant from this regression because the p-value on 
the interaction term is less than 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
